Skip to main content
Category: Predicate Offenses

Insider Trading

Simply put

Insider trading generally refers to buying or selling a company's stock or other securities based on important information about the company that has not yet been made public. Because this information is confidential and could affect the security's price, trading on it can give an unfair advantage over other market participants. In many jurisdictions this conduct may constitute a criminal offense, though it is important to distinguish unlawful insider dealing from the lawful, disclosed trading that company insiders may legitimately undertake.

Formal definition

Insider trading is the trading of a public company's securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information (MNPI) concerning that company. The concept typically hinges on two elements: the materiality of the information (its likely relevance to an investment decision) and its nonpublic status. Terminology and precise legal tests vary by jurisdiction. In US law, insider trading is addressed within the broader securities-fraud framework, with the term commonly analyzed by reference to persons having access to confidential or material nonpublic information about the issuer. In some civil-law jurisdictions the offense is codified directly by statute; the evidence notes, for example, that it is defined as a criminal offense under the French Monetary and Financial Code. A critical distinction exists between the criminal-law meaning of insider trading (which requires the applicable legal elements, such as knowing possession and use of MNPI, to be established) and the lawful form of insider transactions, in which corporate insiders may buy or sell their own company's securities subject to disclosure and other regulatory requirements. Specific definitions, thresholds, and enforcement standards should be confirmed against the applicable regime.

Why it matters

Insider trading strikes at the integrity and fairness of securities markets. When individuals trade on material, nonpublic information (MNPI), they gain an advantage over other participants who lack access to the same information, undermining the level playing field that public markets depend on. For compliance officers, investigators, and risk professionals, understanding insider trading is essential because it sits within the broader market abuse and securities-fraud frameworks that obliged entities and market participants must monitor, detect, and, where appropriate, report.

The stakes are heightened by the fact that insider trading may constitute a criminal offense in many jurisdictions, while a closely related activity, the disclosed, lawful trading that corporate insiders may legitimately undertake in their own company's securities, remains permitted subject to regulatory requirements. This distinction is critical: the presence of an insider transaction, an alert, or a suspicious pattern does not by itself establish wrongdoing. Establishing the criminal-law offense typically requires the applicable legal elements, such as knowing possession and use of MNPI, to be met, and precise legal tests vary by regime.

Because definitions, thresholds, and enforcement standards differ across jurisdictions, for example, insider trading is addressed within the securities-fraud framework in US law, while it is codified directly as a criminal offense under the French Monetary and Financial Code, professionals must be careful not to assume a single global standard applies. Applying the correct legal framework to the relevant market and conduct is fundamental to accurate analysis, monitoring, and any escalation or reporting decision.

Who it's relevant to

Compliance Officers
Compliance teams at issuers, broker-dealers, asset managers, and other market participants design and maintain controls, such as information barriers, restricted and watch lists, personal account dealing rules, and trade surveillance, intended to detect, deter, and manage the risk of insider trading. They must also distinguish lawful, disclosed insider transactions from potentially unlawful trading on MNPI, recognizing that no single control eliminates the risk.
Market Surveillance and Financial Intelligence Analysts
Analysts monitoring trading activity assess patterns that may indicate the use of material, nonpublic information, evaluating both the materiality and the nonpublic status of information relevant to a transaction. They should treat alerts and suspicious patterns as indicators warranting further review rather than as proof of wrongdoing, given that the criminal-law offense requires the applicable legal elements to be established.
Investigators and Enforcement Professionals
Those investigating potential market abuse must apply the correct legal test for the relevant jurisdiction, for example, the securities-fraud framework in the US or the codified offense under the French Monetary and Financial Code, and gather evidence sufficient to address elements such as knowing possession and use of MNPI. They should confirm specific definitions, thresholds, and enforcement standards against the applicable regime.
Corporate Insiders and Legal Advisers
Directors, officers, employees, and their advisers need to understand where lawful insider transactions in their own company's securities are permitted subject to disclosure and other regulatory requirements, and where trading on material, nonpublic information may cross into unlawful conduct. Clear awareness of this boundary supports appropriate governance, disclosure, and pre-clearance practices.

Inside Insider Trading

Material Non-Public Information (MNPI)
Information that is both material (a reasonable investor would likely consider it important to an investment decision) and not yet available to the general market. The precise formulation of materiality and non-public status varies by jurisdiction and is generally shaped by securities regulators and case law rather than a single global standard.
Duty or Relationship of Trust
In many jurisdictions, liability turns on a breach of a fiduciary duty or a similar relationship of trust and confidence owed to the source of the information. The exact theory of liability differs between regimes, and some frameworks rely on broader concepts such as possession or misuse of inside information rather than a strict duty-based test.
Dealing, Tipping, and Recommending
Insider trading regimes typically distinguish between trading on inside information oneself, disclosing (tipping) it to others, and recommending or inducing transactions based on it. The scope of each prohibited act, and any requirement of personal benefit, generally depends on the applicable regime.
Primary Insiders and Secondary Recipients
Frameworks often differentiate between those with direct access to inside information (such as directors, officers, or employees) and secondary recipients (tippees) who obtain it indirectly. The obligations and thresholds for liability may differ between these categories depending on jurisdiction.
Regulatory and Criminal Dimensions
Insider trading may be pursued as a regulatory or civil enforcement matter, a criminal offence, or both, depending on the jurisdiction and the conduct. The compliance obligation to detect and report suspected market abuse is distinct from any finding of criminal or civil liability, which is a matter for the relevant authorities and courts.
Relationship to AML and Market Abuse Controls
Insider trading is commonly treated as a predicate offence for money laundering, meaning proceeds derived from it may fall within AML obligations, and it typically sits alongside market manipulation within broader market abuse frameworks. The precise categorisation and the obliged entities affected vary by regime and should be confirmed against applicable law.

Common questions

Answers to the questions practitioners most commonly ask about Insider Trading.

Is insider trading the same thing as money laundering?
No. Insider trading is a market abuse offence involving dealing in securities on the basis of material non-public information (or improperly disclosing such information), whereas money laundering concerns the processing of proceeds derived from criminal conduct. The two are distinct concepts, though they can intersect: profits generated from insider trading may themselves constitute criminal property that is subsequently laundered. In that scenario, insider trading is the predicate offence and the laundering is a separate act. The precise definitions, offences, and enforcement bodies for each differ by jurisdiction and should be confirmed against the applicable securities and AML regimes.
Does a suspicious transaction alert or an unusual trading pattern prove that insider trading has occurred?
No. An alert, a market surveillance flag, or an anomalous trading pattern is an indicator that may warrant further review or, where applicable, a regulatory filing. It does not establish that an offence has taken place. Insider trading is a criminal and/or regulatory law concept requiring the relevant legal elements to be proven to the applicable standard by the competent authority. Compliance filings and internal alerts operate at the level of suspicion or reporting obligation and should not be treated as findings of wrongdoing.
How should firms structure surveillance to detect potential insider trading?
Firms typically deploy trade surveillance systems configured to detect patterns that may be consistent with dealing on material non-public information, such as unusual activity ahead of price-sensitive announcements. These measures are designed to detect and manage risk rather than guarantee prevention. The scope of monitoring, the instruments covered, and the calibration of alerts generally depend on the firm's business, applicable market abuse rules, and its own risk assessment. The specific obligations and thresholds vary by regime and should be confirmed against the applicable regulations.
What is the relationship between insider trading controls and information barriers?
Information barriers (sometimes referred to as internal segregation of functions) are organisational and physical controls intended to restrict the flow of material non-public information between parts of a firm that may have conflicting interests. They function as a measure to mitigate the risk that inside information is misused, but they do not eliminate that risk. Firms generally supplement barriers with restricted and watch lists, personal account dealing rules, and training. The exact expectations for such arrangements differ by jurisdiction and should be verified against the applicable market conduct rules.
How do insider trading concerns interact with AML suspicious activity reporting?
Where the proceeds of suspected insider trading may constitute criminal property, an obliged entity may have a separate obligation to file a suspicious activity or suspicious transaction report under the applicable AML regime, in addition to any market abuse reporting obligation owed to the securities regulator. These are distinct reporting channels arising from different instruments and directed to different authorities. Firms should identify which obligations apply to their situation and file accordingly, confirming the specific triggers and recipients against the relevant AML and market abuse rules.
What role do personal account dealing policies play in managing insider trading risk?
Personal account dealing policies typically require employees to obtain pre-clearance for certain trades, observe restricted lists, and refrain from dealing while in possession of material non-public information. Such policies are a control intended to deter and detect misuse of inside information at the individual level; they manage risk rather than remove it. The scope of covered persons, instruments, and pre-clearance requirements generally varies by firm and by the applicable regulatory framework, and exact requirements should be confirmed against the relevant rules.

Common misconceptions

Any trading by a company insider constitutes insider trading.
Insiders may lawfully trade in their own company's securities in many jurisdictions, often subject to conditions such as pre-clearance, closed periods, or disclosure. Liability generally arises from trading on the basis of material non-public information, or otherwise misusing it, rather than from insider status alone. The precise conditions vary by regime and should be confirmed against applicable rules.
A suspicious transaction report, alert, or trading pattern proves insider trading occurred.
A surveillance alert, an internal escalation, or a regulatory filing reflects a suspicion or a control being triggered; it does not establish that an offence has been committed. Whether conduct amounts to insider trading is determined by the relevant authorities and courts under the applicable legal test, not by the existence of an alert or report.
The rules on insider trading are the same everywhere.
The elements, including how materiality and non-public status are defined, whether a duty or personal benefit is required, and whether the matter is treated as civil, criminal, or regulatory, differ across jurisdictions. There is no single universal definition, so practitioners should apply the specific instruments and regulators relevant to the markets and entities in scope.

Best practices

Maintain clear internal policies defining material non-public information, restricted and watch lists, closed periods, and pre-clearance procedures for personal account dealing, and align them with the specific market abuse and securities rules applicable to your jurisdiction and business lines.
Deploy trade surveillance and market abuse monitoring calibrated to your instruments, client base, and risk profile, treating alerts as indicators to investigate rather than as conclusions of wrongdoing.
Establish information barriers and access controls to segregate those who may hold inside information, and document how the effectiveness of these controls is reviewed, recognising they mitigate rather than eliminate risk.
Ensure escalation and reporting channels are in place so suspected market abuse can be assessed and, where required, reported to the relevant competent authority in line with the applicable regime, keeping this function distinct from any legal determination of liability.
Address insider trading within the AML framework where it may be a predicate offence, ensuring suspected proceeds are considered under applicable suspicious activity or suspicious transaction reporting obligations, and confirm exact thresholds and triggers against the governing regulations.
Provide targeted training to employees and insiders on their obligations, prohibited conduct, and reporting duties, and periodically test and update controls to reflect changes in the relevant regulatory frameworks.